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In human societies, social behaviour is strongly inﬂuenced by threats of punishment, even though the
threats themselves rarely need to be exercised. Recent experimental evidence suggests that similar
hidden threats can promote cooperation and limit within-group selﬁshness in some animal systems.
In other animals, however, threats appear to be ineffective. Here I review theoretical and empirical
studies that help to understand the evolutionary causes of these contrasting patterns, and identify
three factors—impact, accuracy and perception—that together determine the effectiveness of threats to
induce cooperation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
An alien observer of human behaviour might take some
time to realize that our social interactions are shaped to
a large extent by hidden threats. Threats of ﬁnes and
incarceration serve to maintain law and order, while
threats of social punishment such as ostracism or peer
criticism encourage us to conform to social norms
[1–3]. But an observer would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to identify
these threats because punishments are triggered only
when the social rules they enforce are broken. The most
effective threats are those that rarely need to be carried
out, and so are least likely to be noticed by an observer.
Recent theory and experimental studies suggest that
hidden threats may play a similarly important role in
shaping the social behaviour of animals. In particular,
threats to terminate a potentially proﬁtable interaction
may limit the level of selﬁshness in cooperative groups
[4–6]. Nature abounds with examples of cooperation
where animals can interact to produce a mutual
inclusive ﬁtness beneﬁt: examples include interspeciﬁc
mutualisms [7,8], biparental care systems [9,10], coop-
eratively breeding species [11–13] and parents with
their offspring [14]. However, conﬂict arises in these
interactions because each individual is selected to
maximize its share of the inclusive ﬁtness proﬁts of
cooperation at the expense of its social partners. For
cooperative associations to form and remain stable,
participating individuals must resolve this conﬂict in
such a way that each prefers to continue the interaction
rather than pursue alternative outside options, such as leav-
ing, evicting or eliminating their partner [5,15,16].
Outside options place a limit on the level of exploitation
that an individual will tolerate before it does better to
break up the interaction. Consequently, threats to
terminate a cooperative interaction (‘exit threats’) can, if
they are effective, curtail the level of within-group
selﬁshness and prevent the dissolution of potentially
proﬁtable associations.
Here I describe theory that helps to understand how
threats can constrain selﬁshness in biological interactions,
and review studies that illustrate the success and failure of
threats to induce cooperation in a variety of systems.
These examples reveal that, in many animals, observed
acts of punishment and control may represent just the
tip of the iceberg of forces shaping social structure and
behaviour.
2. THREATS AND SOCIAL CONTROL: THEORY
To focus our discussion, consider the interaction between
two individuals, A and B, who can interact in some way
that produces a net direct ﬁtness proﬁt. The two individ-
uals face conﬂict because each is selected to increase
its share of the total proﬁts (or ﬁtness ‘surplus’) at the
expense of its partner’s share. This surplus is represented
in ﬁgure 1a by a line with player A’s preferred outcome at
one end and player B’s preferred outcome at the other.
Each player’s ﬁtness payoff (or inclusive ﬁtness payoff in
the case of relatives) resulting from the interaction is
assumed to be an increasing function of their share of
the total proﬁts. The ﬁgure shows the simplest case,
where ﬁtness is directly proportional to this share, the ﬁt-
ness surplus is constant irrespective of how it is
distributed and the players are unrelated (so that indirect
ﬁtness effects can be ignored).
Layered on top of this we need to consider the alterna-
tive outside options that may be available to the two
individuals. Each of the two players may have the
option to terminate the interaction to pursue these out-
side options (for example, by leaving, evicting or
eliminating their partner), in which case they can expect
payoff pA and pB, respectively. If a player has more than
one outside option, we need only plot the highest-
paying outside option on our line, since other outside
options will never be chosen. If none of a player’s outside *m.a.cant@exeter.ac.uk
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of the ﬁtness proﬁts, then that player effectively has no
outside option. The zone between the outside options of
the two players represents the set of outcomes, where
both players proﬁt from the interaction. In economic
models this is called the ‘bargaining set’ [17]. To avoid
unnecessary duplication of terms I follow this usage here.
How will the two individuals resolve conﬂict over the
division of the ‘pie’ of proﬁts? Theoretically, we can
distinguish two distinct ways by which animals might
inﬂuence this competition: (i) bargaining and (ii) the
use of threats. The distinction lies in the assumed game
structure of the interaction between players. A bargaining
process involves a potentially inﬁnite exchange of actions
or signals that may converge to some equilibrium or be-
havioural ‘settlement’. By contrast, threats arise when
one player can make a ‘last move’ to terminate the inter-
action or inﬂict a lasting cost on the other player. The
threat to exercise this last move generates an incentive
for the other player to exercise restraint in its claims on
the ﬁtness surplus. Both these processes are elements of
behavioural ‘negotiation’ and presuppose the ability
of each individual to respond on a behavioural timescale
to changes in the behaviour of the other (i.e. they
invoke evolutionary ‘rules for responding’ rather than
ﬁxed genetic strategies; see [10,18]).
The process of bargaining might take various forms in
nature. In cooperative breeders, for example, dominant
and subordinate breeders might engage in aggressive
interactions to claim or defend resources required for
reproduction, or to signal a willingness to escalate in con-
ﬂict [19–21]. Offspring may engage in costly acts or
signals to claim additional resources from parents or sib-
lings [22,23]. In species that exhibit biparental care, a
male and female parent may bargain by mutual adjust-
ment of provisioning effort [10,18]. The ability of one
party to shift the resolution in its own favour (which we
can call its ‘bargaining power’) will depend on asymme-
tries in quality or the ability to sustain costs during
bargaining [10,24]. There may also be asymmetries in
bargaining power that have nothing to do with their indi-
vidual attributes; for example, it may be cheaper for one
party to increase its level of service or resource production
than the other [4]. In cooperative species it may be easier
for a subordinate helper to shirk than it is for a dominant
to force it to help. This latter example illustrates the point
that, depending on the context, one party may be a stron-
ger bargainer even though it is physically weaker and
socially subordinate to the other [3].
What if the bargained resolution lies outside the bar-
gaining set? In this case one of the players possesses a
credible threat to break up the association. The threat is
credible because it is in the threatener’s own interest to
exercise its outside option when its expected payoff
from bargaining is less than its outside option. This
threat can affect the resolution by forcing the other
player to ‘ease off’ in bargaining until the threat is no
longer credible; that is, to concede just enough ﬁtness
to the other player to match its relevant outside option.
If, on the other hand, the bargained resolution lies
within the bargaining set, neither player’s threat to exer-
cise their outside option is credible because it would not
pay either of them to carry out their threat. In economics
this is sometimes referred to as the outside option principle:
outside options are relevant only where they yield a higher
payoff than can be obtained through bargaining [25].
A corollary of the argument is that onlyone player’s outside
option can be relevant at a time, because if both players
receive less at the negotiated equilibrium than they would
gain from pursuing their outside option, there is nothing
to be gained from trying to cooperate in the ﬁrst place.
The outside option principle can be used to develop ‘syn-
thetic’ models of conﬂict resolution that incorporate
threats and bargaining in the same framework [5].
We expect strong selection to avoid triggering threats
because a stronger bargainer experiences a sudden drop
in ﬁtness if a threat is triggered. Figure 1b shows how
the ﬁtness of our two players changes across the threat
threshold. In this example, assume that player A has
greater bargaining power and can push the bargaining
settlement across the threat threshold of player B.A t
this point, B decides to take up its outside option (say,
to leave the group) and receives a payoff proportional to
pB, but as a consequence of this decision player A’s ﬁtness
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Figure 1. (a) Fitness surplus and bargaining set in two-player cooperative association. Both parties beneﬁt from cooperation if
they can negotiate a settlement u*, which lies in the bargaining set (the thick black line). In the case shown, the two parties are
of equal ‘bargaining power’, so u* is located at pA ¼ pB ¼ 0.5. (b) Fitness payoffs accruing to player A (solid line) and player B
(dotted line) as a function of the negotiated outcome u*.
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ﬁtness pA. The threat threshold represents a ﬁtness
‘cliff-edge’ for the recipient of the threat [26]. Player A
does best to push player B’s share down as close to the
threat threshold as possible, without triggering it. Both
players can therefore gain from effective communication
to avoid triggering the threat unnecessarily. In §3, I
describe cases where there is good evidence of pre-
emptive behaviour to avoid triggering a threat, indicating
that credible means of communicating (or detecting)
threats do exist in nature, at least in some systems.
3. EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE THREATS
IN NATURE
The type of exit threats that are relevant in animal systems
will depend on the availability of alternative partners or
resources, and whether one party is able to control
group membership or access to resources. I focus on
three types of threat in particular: the threats to evict,
depart or to attack the other player. In each case
I review examples that illustrate the effectiveness (or
lack thereof) of threats to inﬂuence behaviour.
(a) The threat of eviction
Some of the clearest evidence of hidden threats at
work comes from recent studies of ﬁsh size hierarchies
[27–32]. In these species, group members exhibit a
size-based queue in which the largest individuals are
breeders and the rest are non-breeders, and there are
often consistent size differences between individuals at
adjacent rank [33]. Experiments have shown that these
size differences between ranks are maintained because
subordinates strategically adjust their growth rates to
remain smaller than their immediate dominant
[27,29,30]. The hypothesis is that subordinates adjust
growth rates to avoid the threat of expulsion from the
group [28]. However, evictions are rarely observed in
nature, and there are other plausible explanations for
size differences in a hierarchy; for example, it may be
that low-rankers have less access to food for growth.
How can we test whether the threat of eviction drives
the formation of the size hierarchy?
The best way to test this idea is to ‘break the rules’
in order to trigger hidden threats. Just this type of
experiment was performed by Wong et al.[ 31] working
on the size hierarchies of the coral-dwelling goby
Paragobiodon xanthosomus (ﬁgure 2a). To test whether
observed size differences reﬂect the threat of eviction,
Wong et al. paired individuals of different size in the
laboratory and recorded their interactions. When there
was a large size difference between the two individuals,
the larger ‘dominant’ ﬁsh tolerated the presence of the
smaller ‘subordinate’. However, when the difference in
size between the two ﬁsh was smaller than the minimum
difference observed in natural groups, dominants
responded by forcibly evicting the subordinate. It was
also clear why dominants stand to gain from evicting sub-
ordinates before they grow too large, since dominants
paired with the largest subordinates often ended up
being evicted themselves. In a second study using intact
groups in aquaria, Wong et al.[ 32] showed that subordi-
nates cease feeding as they approach the size threshold at
which eviction is likely to be triggered. This indicates that
these subordinates were able to detect the presence of the
eviction threat and respond pre-emptively to avoid
triggering it.
In these ﬁsh hierarchies, the threat of eviction is a
powerful inducement to exercise restraint because subor-
dinates place a high value on continued membership of
the group, while dominants have little to lose by evicting
them. The same factors apply in many cooperatively
breeding vertebrates, particularly where the presence of
subordinates threatens the reproductive monopoly of
dominant breeders [34]. In meerkats, for example, subor-
dinate females are forcibly evicted from the group by
dominant females, and only allowed to return after the
dominant has given birth [35,36]. Subordinate females
that are pregnant at the time of eviction often abort
their litter in the period when they are excluded from
the group, lose weight and show signs of elevated endocri-
nological stress [37]. Consequently, eviction by the
dominant female substantially reduces the probability
that a subordinate will reproduce successfully. It is clear,
however, that compared with ﬁsh size hierarchies, the
threat of eviction is not a wholly effective deterrent in
meerkats, since subordinates commonly reproduce,
albeit at a much lower rate than dominants [38]. In
banded mongooses, dominant females use eviction to
limit the number of breeding females in the group,
but there is no evidence that subordinates exercise pre-
emptive restraint to avoid being evicted in the ﬁrst
place [39]. Threats may be less effective in social
mongooses because eviction is often temporary and has
less lethal consequences than it does in the social
ﬁsh systems.
Finally, the threat of eviction plays a central role in
‘pay-to-stay’ models of helping behaviour. The idea here
is that subordinates may be forced to pay ‘rent’ by helping
in order to be tolerated in the group [40,41]. Again, the
best evidence comes from a ﬁsh system, the cooperative
cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher. In a ﬁeld study helpers
that were removed for periods of 4–6 hours were attacked
or evicted upon their return, and those that were per-
mitted to stay worked harder thereafter [42]. In the
laboratory, breeders evicted helpers when they had little
need for their help, and allowed them to return when
help was required [43]; and helpers reduced their
effort levels when they were provided with options to
breed independently [44]. Finally, helpers that were
experimentally prevented from defending the group
against a predator (by denying them information of the
predator’s presence) responded by increasing their
helping effort, which the authors argue may serve to
appease the dominant and avert expulsion [45]. Note,
however, that this manipulation to break the rules did
not trigger eviction, contrary to the prediction of pay-
to-stay models, although this may be because of the
short-term nature of the manipulation. In other species,
with a few rare exceptions (e.g. superb fairy-wrens
[46]), there is very little evidence in support of pay-to-
stay models. This can be attributed in part to the scarcity
of experimental studies to manipulate helper effort [47].
However, it may also reﬂect the inefﬁciency of eviction
as a strategy to punish helpers, even lazy ones. Eviction
will be much more cost-effective when used to punish
reproductive rivals or competitors that actively inﬂict
costs on the evictor.
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Where alternative partners or resources are readily avail-
able and there is no territorial or positional advantage
from staying put, it may be more proﬁtable simply to
leave rather than contest a resource or attempt an evic-
tion. The threat of departure is highlighted in biological
market theory, in which the ability to exercise ‘partner
choice’ is a main promoter of cooperative behaviour
[6,48]. In the cleaner ﬁsh Laboroides dimidiatus, ﬁeld
observations suggest that the threat of departure by
clients may induce cleaners to cooperate rather than
cheat (i.e. to feed on ectoparasites rather than on
preferred client tissue; ﬁgure 2b)[ 49]. Laboratory exper-
iments support this hypothesis: cleaners quickly learn to
be more cooperative with artiﬁcial ‘clients’ (Plexiglas
plates containing food) that depart in response to ‘cheat-
ing’ (feeding on a preferred food type) compared with
clients that do not [50,51]. Partner choice is argued to
be a key driver of cooperation in other interspeciﬁc mutu-
alisms [8,52], and in intraspeciﬁc contexts such as mating
markets and sexual selection [53,54], grooming behaviour
[55,56] and helping effort in cooperative breeders [57].
However, these studies have not manipulated cooperation
or outside options experimentally, so deﬁnitive evidence
of effective departure threats in these contexts is lacking.
In the study of cooperative breeding, the threat of
departure forms the basis of classic ‘concession’ models
of reproductive skew, which seek to explain variation in
reproductive partitioning within groups [58,59]. These
models suggest that where dominants gain from retaining
subordinates in the group, they may do best to yield a
share of reproduction as an incentive to keep them in
the group. Unlike the case for biological markets, how-
ever, there is little evidence that departure threats
inﬂuence the resolution of within-group conﬂict in coop-
erative breeders. For many cooperative breeders, the
option to remain in the group as a non-breeder is often
preferable to departure because subordinates can expect
to inherit breeding positions in future, and because
there are often tight ecological constraints on dispersal
and independent breeding [60]. As noted, far from offer-
ing a staying incentive to keep subordinates in the group,
dominants in many species go to considerable lengths to
evict them. To date, two studies have managed to manip-
ulate the availability of outside options experimentally to
look for an effect on skew (on a social bee [61] and a
cichlid ﬁsh [62]). Neither study found an effect on the
level of reproductive sharing. Moreover, experiments to
reduce the share of paternity obtained by subordinate
males in cooperative breeders have never led to the depar-
ture of these males, as would be expected if they were
ceded paternity to keep them in the group [19,63]. Overall,
there is little evidence that the threat of departure is
effective in reproductive competition in either insect
or vertebrate cooperative breeders, although more
experiments are needed.
(c) Threats of attack
The third major type of threat is that of physical attack.
Unlike eviction and departure, physical attacks do not
necessarily lead to the termination of the interaction,
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2. Effective and ineffective threats in nature. (a) The threat of eviction: in the coral-dwelling goby Paragobiodon
xanthosomus subordinates adjust their growth to avoid triggering the threat of eviction by dominants [31,32]. (b) The threat
of departure: studies of the cleaner ﬁsh Labroides dimidiatus and its clients suggest that the threat of departure can deter cleaners
from ‘cheating’ (that is, feeding on client tissue rather than their ectoparasites [49–51]). (c) The threat of attack: subordinates
of the queenless ant Dinoponera quadriceps appear to be deterred from challenging the dominant female by the threat of attack
from nestmates. Dominant females mark challengers (such as female 14 in this photo) with a chemical that singles them out for
‘immobilization’ by other workers [66]. (d) An ineffective threat: in banded mongooses Mungos mungo, dominant females limit
reproductive competition by evicting subordinate females from the group, but females do not exercise pre-emptive reproductive
restraint to avoid eviction [39]. In this species, evicted females are often permitted to return, and even non-breeders are some-
times evicted, two factors that reduce the effectiveness of the threat of eviction as a deterrent. Photos: (a) Marion Wong; (b)
Maxi Eckes; (c) Thibaud Monnin; (d) Roman Fuller.
Review. Threats and animal cooperation M. A. Cant 173
Proc. R. Soc. B (2011)unless ﬁghting is lethal. Low-level aggression and domi-
nance interactions might therefore be viewed as part of
a bargaining process, rather than as a ‘last move’. How-
ever, where attacks inﬂict death, permanent damage or
otherwise produce a step change in the ﬁtness of the
victim (ﬁgure 1b), the decision to attack is equivalent to
an outside option, and may deter selﬁshness or induce
cooperation in much the same way as a threat to break
up the group.
Threats of attack may be directed against cooperative
partners themselves, or against their offspring. For
example, many social Hymenoptera queens and workers
use aggression or egg-eating to deter their nestmates
from reproducing (or developing into reproductives), a
behaviour known as ‘policing’ (reviewed by Ratnieks
and co-workers [64,65]). Policing is usually inferred
from observations of aggression or oophagy (see table
S1 in [64]), but, as with human policing, insect policing
operates most efﬁciently via the use of threats. In the
queenless ant Dinoponera quadriceps, for example, domi-
nant breeders can prevent high-ranking subordinates
from challenging their position by daubing them with a
pheromone, which marks them out for attack and ‘immo-
bilization’ by other workers [66]. This threat dramatically
increases the potential costs of challenging to subordi-
nates, and helps to stabilize the hierarchy in natural
colonies [67,68]. In other species, queen-removal exper-
iments suggest that the threat of physical attack helps to
deter subordinates from becoming reproductively active
(for example in hymenopterans [69–72] and naked
mole rats [73–75]). In general, the formation of a
stable dominance hierarchy presupposes the presence of
effective threats (of attack or eviction) to deter challenges
from lower-ranked individuals. Hierarchies reduce the
costs of conﬂict precisely because they are stabilized by
threats that rarely need to be exercised.
Threats of attack against offspring can also deter repro-
duction, particularly in species where each offspring
represents a relatively large parental investment. In mar-
mosets and meerkats, for example, dominant females
sometimes kill the offspring of subordinates that repro-
duce. These acts occur infrequently, however, because
the threat of infanticide is usually sufﬁcient to deter sub-
ordinates from attempting to reproduce in the ﬁrst place
[76,77]. When subordinate mammals do breed, it
is usually the oldest or largest females that do so [38],
perhaps because they can defend their offspring more
effectively or possess a credible threat of retaliation of
their own. A priori, we would expect threats of infanticide
to be much less effective in insect societies, where eggs
can be produced and replaced very cheaply. Indeed,
workers lay eggs even in systems where almost all of
them are destined to be policed [65,78]. Nevertheless,
across nine monogynous wasp species (plus the honeybee
Apis mellifera), the average level of worker reproduction
declined with the efﬁciency of policing [78], which is
consistent with the hypothesis that policing involves an
element of deterrence (what Ratnieks & Wenseleers [65]
term ‘preventive policing’).
4. WHEN WILL THREATS BE EFFECTIVE?
It is clear from this brief survey that, ﬁrst, with a few
notable exceptions, evidence for the presence of effective
hidden threats is scarce; and, second, that the number of
studies that are designed (or could be expected) to detect
the inﬂuence of threats is small. Where experiments to
manipulate cooperation or outside options have been car-
ried out (e.g. in ﬁsh size hierarchies, cooperative cichlids,
cleaner–client systems and social insects), threats are
often found to inﬂuence cooperation. Hopefully, further
experimental studies of cooperative systems are forthcom-
ing. Pending these we can synthesize the existing
information to identify factors that are likely to promote
the effectiveness of threats in biological systems. Three
factors will be particularly important: the impact of a
threat, the accuracy with which it is targeted and its per-
ception (that is, the level of information about the threat
on both sides).
First, the impact of a threat is the inclusive ﬁtness cost
that the transgressor stands to suffer if the threat is trig-
gered. Threats will have greatest impact where the
ﬁtness value of outside options is low and when triggering
a threat represents an irreversible ﬁnal move in the inter-
action. This helps to explain why eviction threats are so
effective in inducing growth restraint in the ﬁsh size hier-
archies, and why evictions are so rarely observed. The cost
of being evicted is undoubtedly extremely high in these
ﬁsh systems as adult ﬁsh are not observed to move
between existing groups [28,79]. In addition, it is very
hard for a subordinate ﬁsh to ‘un-grow’ once it has
crossed the threshold for eviction, so it must approach
the threat threshold very cautiously indeed. In banded
mongooses (ﬁgure 2d) and meerkats, by contrast, evicted
females can ‘take back their move’ by aborting their litter,
in which case they are readily accepted back into the
group [36,39]. Similarly, a wasp worker whose egg is
policed can always produce another one, at little ﬁtness
cost. These low impact and repeated punishments blur
our simple distinction between negotiation and threats,
and will have little lasting deterrent effect.
Second, a threat needs to be accurately targeted so that
transgressors suffer the consequences of their own
actions. In the two-player ‘restraint’ skew model of
Johnstone & Cant [34], the threat of eviction is effective
at inducing reproductive restraint in a subordinate,
because a subordinate that claims too large a share of
reproduction is certain to suffer the cost of being evicted.
In larger groups, by contrast, it may be difﬁcult for
a dominant to identify transgressors with certainty.
Discrimination or targeting errors will weaken the effec-
tiveness of a threat in two ways. First, transgressors may
escape punishment. Second, targeting errors erode the
incentive to cooperate because a non-transgressor may
end up being punished anyway [80,81]. For these
reasons, threats rapidly become ineffective as targeting
accuracy declines ([39]; see ﬁgure 3). Threats will there-
fore be most effective in dyadic interactions, in groups in
which there is a clear dominance hierarchy, or where there
are other mechanisms by which cheaters can reliably be
identiﬁed. In ﬁsh size hierarchies, for example, each sub-
ordinate is clearly identiﬁable to its immediate dominant
at all times and can be singled out for eviction if it
grows too large in size. In ants the threat of worker
attack is effective as a reproductive deterrent because
reproductively active workers can be detected from their
signature cuticular hydrocarbons [71], or daubed with
an identifying chemical mark [66].
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parties have information about the consequences of the
threat and the conditions under which it would be carried
out. Each party must have some estimate of the value of
outside options relative to the payoff of continued
cooperation in order to assess whether threats are credible
and respond appropriately. In situations where individuals
interact repeatedly or with a series of partners, this infor-
mation could be gained through trial-and-error learning
[50,82]. Alternatively, cooperators could signal to each
other their willingness to exercise an outside option. In
the example shown in ﬁgure 1b, player A has a strong
incentive to heed any signals from B that it is about to
exercise its threat, but at the same time B has an incentive
to exaggerate its willingness to exercise a threat. Signals
aimed at conveying an imminent threat will therefore
lack credibility unless they are costly in some way to the
signaller [3,83,84]. Facial signals, dominance displays
and low-level aggression may credibly signal an impend-
ing threat of eviction or attack if they involve real costs
to signallers. On the other hand, receivers may gain a stra-
tegic advantage if they can remain credibly ignorant of a
threat signal or of the value of outside options. In Polistes
wasps, for example, dominant foundresses rarely leave the
nest, so they may remain insensitive to threats by their
subordinates that are based on the value of outside
options [60]. The topic of how and when threats are sig-
nalled, concealed or credibly ignored presents rich
possibilities for future research.
I began by drawing an analogy between human and
animal threats, but it is important to distinguish between
the types of threat that are employed in human affairs and
those we should expect to see in animals. In interactions
among humans, one party can gain advantage by
making a ‘strategic threat’—that is, by committing himself
or herself to carry out a threat in the event of a transgres-
sion, even though there would no longer be an incentive
to do so in the event that the transgression occurred
[3,17,84]. For example, a kidnapper might threaten to
kill a hostage unless a ransom is paid. However, for this
threat to be credible, the kidnapper must establish a com-
mitment to follow through with the execution in the event
of non-payment, even though there would be little or no
incentive to do so at that point (assuming, that is, no
other cost of hostage release). In animals, it may be difﬁ-
cult for individuals to bind themselves to carry out threats
which would yield no immediate gain (although
McNamara & Houston [85] suggest some scenarios
where this may be possible). If an animal carries out a
threat, it is likely that there is an immediate or future
beneﬁt from doing so at that point; for example, because
exercising the threat protects them from further exploita-
tion. Schelling ([3], p. 123) calls this type of threat a
‘warning’, to distinguish it from the type of strategic
threats that require commitment to be credible. Threats
to exercise outside options such as eviction, departure
and attack are inherently credible because they are trig-
gered when this is in the threatener’s immediate
interest. These are the most relevant threats for animal
systems.
5. CONCLUSION
Social partners impose constraints on an individual’s
behaviour through actions and threats. Actions are easy
to observe; threats are much more difﬁcult. Threats will
be most prevalent in dyadic interactions, where there
are large asymmetries in bargaining power or the value
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ing but escaping eviction. The targeting parameter z varies from 0 (implying that subordinates are equally likely to be evicted
whether they choose to cooperate or defect) to 1 (implying that a subordinate who cooperates is never evicted). The case where
z ¼ 1 applies to groups that exhibit a hierarchical structure, such that each individual monitors and punishes its immediate
subordinate (labelled ‘chain of command’ in the ﬁgure). As the accuracy of targeting declines, the threat of eviction rapidly
becomes ineffective at enforcing cooperation. See [39] for details of the model.
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Proc. R. Soc. B (2011)of group membership, and where there are effective sig-
nalling systems. Threats are implicated in stable
dominance hierarchies, and where animals appear to
have plenty to ﬁght over, but overt conﬂict is absent. In
each case, the best way to test for the presence of
hidden threats is to disturb the status quo by experimen-
tally inducing or simulating transgression, adding or
removing outside options, or manipulating the infor-
mation each party has about the value of group
membership or outside options. Pushing cooperative
interactions out of equilibrium and observing the
response is an incisive technique to study cooperation
because it can yield information on the evolutionary
causes of inequity and the means by which animals nego-
tiate, and reveal the full range of forces, hidden and
apparent, that bind cooperative interactions together.
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